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This paper develops a methodology for trade policy analysis of costs and 
benefits of alternative regional integration scenarios, based on the 
disaggregated gravity equation, and applies it to calculate the impact of the 
EU enlargement on integration strategies of non-member countries. 
In particular, the paper measures the impact of the 2004 EU enlargement 
from the standpoint of Ukraine – a country that has been lost in transition; 
Ukraine moves away from CIS, but does not get closer to EU. This angle 
allows estimating the costs of non-integration that occurred due to trade and 
investment diversion, and forgone opportunity to carry our structural changes 
in the Ukrainian economy. 
According to the results, EU accession would have had a small positive 
effect on total export volumes but would have dramatically changed the 
composition of Ukrainian exports by almost doubling exports of manufactured 
goods by 2007. The costs of non-integration accumulate towards the end of 
the investigated period. Projecting the results into the future clearly indicates 
that the benefits of EU accession for Ukraine would have been unambiguously 
positive and would overweight benefits of CIS integration. 
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1  Introduction 
The studies of European Union (EU) enlargement mostly focus on the impact of the 
enlargement on the current and new EU members (e.g. Bussière et al. 2008, Nilsson, 
2000, Baldwin, 1995 and 1997, Gros and Gonciarz 1996). This paper looks at the impact 
of EU enlargement from a different angle and estimates the costs of non-integration into 
EU. It develops a methodology for evaluating alternative regional integration scenarios. 
                                                 
* oshepotylo@eerc.kiev.ua Comparing costs and benefits of different integration scenarios, a policymaker decides on 
the best integration strategy for a county. 
  When an additional country joins a regional trade bloc, it imposes additional costs 
on outsiders due to trade and investment diversion
1. The costs of non-integration are 
growing when more countries join the bloc, which triggers a new wave of enlargement, a 
so-called domino effect introduced by Baldwin (1993). For example, the enlargement of 
the European Economic Community (EEC) – a process that started in 1960s – induced 
integration of the members of the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) into the EEC: 
“The 1960s saw rapid discriminatory liberalisation with the EEC and EFTA. This had a dramatic effect on 
trade patterns. The EEC’s share of trade with itself rose from 30 to 50 per cent. The share of EEC imports 
from other European nations stagnated or fell. This discrimination meant lost profit opportunities for 
exporters in both groups, but since the EEC market was more than twice the size of EFTA’s market (and 
growing faster), the EEC club was far more attractive to exporting firms. This generated new political 
economy forces within the EFTA nations – forces that pushed for EEC membership.” (Baldwin, 2008). 
The impact of the EEC formation on UK and its decision to join the EEC has been 
studied quite extensively (see Baldwin and Venables, 1994) for discussion of different 
approaches to evaluate the impact). In particular, Aitken (1973) used the gravity equation 
to evaluate trade creation and trade diversion generated by EEC and EFTA. 
  Currently, a similar process involving the EU and Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) trading blocs is evolving. The differences in size and level of development 
between EU and CIS blocs imply that the EU bloc is more attractive and the opportunity 
costs of not-integrating into the EU are higher. Recently, EU has expanded by 12 new 
members, mostly by countries that for a long time had been important trading partners of 
CIS countries. At the same time, Georgia left the CIS in August, 2009, while Ukraine and 
Central Asia countries significantly reduced their involvement into the CIS programs. 
These developments indirectly indicate that the EU accession strategy looks as an 
increasingly attractive policy for the CIS countries. However, the literature says little on 
how the different integration scenarios can be compared. 
  What are the costs for the CIS countries of not integrating into EU? Do the costs 
of non-integration exceed the benefits of staying in the CIS? Empirically, this question 
                                                 
1 In EFTA nations, the possibility of investment diversion was an important factor in the policy debates on 
EC membership: Baldwin et al. (1992) showed outflows of investments from EFTA countries due to the 
EEC enlargement. 
  2has not been studied and the primary goal of this paper is to evaluate the ex post costs of 
non-integration. To answer these questions, the paper focuses on Ukraine. De facto, 
Ukraine is a member of the CIS. However, Ukraine participates in the CIS programs very 
selectively and the Ukrainian parliament never ratified the CIS Charter. Moreover, after 
2004, Ukraine explicitly declared the EU accession as its strategic goal and further 
reduced cooperation with the CIS. On the other hand, Ukraine is an eligible candidate for 
enlargement based on the geographical criteria. It is an important EU trading partner that 
moves towards EU both politically and economically. In February, 2008, the Ukraine has 
started a round of free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations with EU which is the next step 
towards the EU integration. The launch of negotiations followed the finalization of 
Ukraine’s WTO accession process on February, 5 2008
2, which was a prerequisite for 
FTA talks. Therefore, the advantage of looking at Ukraine while comparing costs and 
benefits of a deeper EU integration vs. deeper CIS integration is as follows. First, it is not 
a purely theoretical exercise but a question of practical importance. Did Ukraine make a 
right choice when declaring the EU integration as the policy priority? Second, the answer 
to this question gives guidance for policymakers of the EU and Ukraine for the decision 
on the future of the EU enlargement process. 
  How Ukrainian exports would look like if the country joined EU in 2004? To 
answer these questions, this paper develops a methodology that allows predicting trade 
patterns of Ukrainian exports in such a hypothetical situation. The offered method 
assumes that the main differences between being an EU member and being a typical CIS 
country stem from the changes in behavioral relationships of the parameters of the gravity 
equation rather than from the changes in factors that represent the gravity forces per se 
(see Egger, Pfaffermayr, and Schmidt 2006). By setting its regulatory framework in line 
with the EU standards, signing a deep FTA with EU, and, in the long run, achieving its 
final goal of becoming a full-fledged EU member, the Ukraine would gradually evolve 
from being a part of the CIS trading bloc with its distinct reliance on export of raw 
materials towards being a part of the EU trading block with a high degree of intra-
industry trade in processed goods. Therefore, its trade patterns would become more in 
                                                 
2 Ukraine submitted the application on November 20, 1993. On 5 February, 2008 it has been announced 
that Ukraine would become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on June 4, 2008 after 
almost 15 years of negotiations 
  3line with the trade patterns of the Eastern European countries. The behavioral changes 
would come from better access to the EU market, changes in the institutional 
environment, deep reforms of the regulatory framework, and standardization of export 
and import regulations. 
  To capture the behavioral changes, the gravity model is estimated for two 
samples: one sample includes sixteen Eastern European countries – twelve EU member 
countries that recently joined EU (EU12)
3 and four countries that are not member of the 
EU but are considered as candidates for enlargement in the future (EUC4)
4; the other 
sample includes nine CIS countries
5. 
  In addition to evaluating the behavioral change, the novelty of the paper lies in 
applying an estimation of the disaggregated gravity equation using the two stage 
procedure developed by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) (henceforth HMR). The 
method explicitly deals with a substantial number of zero trade flows, and unobserved 
firm-level heterogeneity. Unlike the HMR method, we exploit both cross-sectional and 
time dimensions to remove the pair-specific fixed effects that can bias the cross-sectional 
results and estimate the impact of the EU accession on bilateral trade flows by the 
Hausman-Taylor method (Hausman and Taylor, 1981) treating the EU accession as an 
endogenous decision that correlates with variable and fixed costs of trade. 
  The model demonstrates substantial costs of not integrating into EU. If the 
Ukraine had became an EU member in 2004, it would have benefited from an increase in 
export volumes, redirection of trade from CIS trading partners towards the EU trading 
partners, and restructuring of exports from industrial products with low value added, 
primarily exports of raw materials, towards exports of manufactured products with high 
value added and exports of agriculture and food
6. Export restructuring directed towards 
more complex, higher value added products is desirable for two reasons: first, it 
diversifies the economy and better protects against negative terms of trade shocks; 
                                                 
3 EU12 includes: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia that joined EU in 2004; Bulgaria and Romania that joined EU in 2007. 
4 EUC4 includes: Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, and Turkey. 
5 CIS sample includes: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, 
and Ukraine. Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are not included due to lack of export data. 
6 The second conclusion is conditional on the degree of trade liberalization of in agricultural and food 
products with old the EU members. 
  4second, production of high value added products is associated with higher future 
economic growth (Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik, 2007). 
  The evidence suggests that the benefits of the EU integration would have come 
not from the EU accession per se but from the gradual process of reforms, economic 
restructuring, and behavioral changes in the bilateral trade relationships with its trading 
partners. The initial losses from breaking the trade relationships with other CIS countries 
would be more than compensated later along the development path. 
  The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 compares existing trade patterns 
of the Eastern European countries with trade patterns of the CIS countries. Section 3 
briefly discusses the methodological issues, presents a theoretical model and develops the 
estimation procedure. Section 4 discusses data. Section 5 presents estimation results for 
aggregated trade data and discusses advantages of the Hausman-Taylor method. It also 
presents estimated gains in disaggregated exports from the EU-Ukraine trade integration 
for two counterfactual experiments. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2  Trade patterns of EU and CIS countries: first glance 
at the data 
The theory of regionalism and preferential trade agreements (i.e. Baldwin, 1993; Baldwin 
et al. 2006) stresses that costs of non-integration into a regional trade bloc increase with 
the size of the bloc which, in turn,  induces more countries to join the bloc due to a so-
called “domino effect”: by lowering trade barriers and improving market access, a 
discriminatory liberalization of trade within a trading bloc gives an edge to the companies 
located within the bloc over the outsiders and create additional incentives for 
multinational companies (MNC) to move their activities inside the bloc. This creates an 
additional pressure for inclusion on outside countries. Hence, once started, the process of 
regionalization captures ever-growing number of countries. 
  The story of the latest EU enlargement illustrates this point. The Council of 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) that, by 1989, included fifteen Soviet republics, 
six Eastern European countries – Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, 
Romania, Poland –, and three other countries – Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam generated a 
  5substantial intra-bloc trade due to a high degree of economic and political integration
7.
 
The economic cooperation with the rest of the world was limited at best and in some 
instances prohibited. Since the beginning of transition, Eastern European countries and 
Baltic States have rapidly moved away from the Moscow-centered economic gravity 
towards the Brussels-centered one. As was correctly predicted by some scholars (i.e. 
Wang and Winters, 1991 Hamilton and Winters, 1992, and Baldwin, 1994), this led to the 
reorientation of their trade flows away from the CMEA countries towards the EU 
members. By 1995, Eastern European trade flows did not differ considerably from that of 
similar Western European countries and mostly exhausted the westward expansion of 
exports at the intensive margins of trade (Gros and Gonciarz (1996). This view is 
supported by a more recent World Bank (2005) report which shows that currently most of 
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EU12 - new EU members in 2004-2007 , CIS - commonwealth of independent states. SITC2 exports at 1 digit level are aggregated  into five groups:
Agriculture and Food - SITC 1 digit codes 0,1, and 2;  Raw materials - codes 3 and 4;         Chemicals - code 5 Processed materials - code 6 Manufactured goods - codes 7 and 8
Billions of US dollars
Figure 1 Exports of EU12 and CIS in 2000-2007
  The accession of the EU12 countries into the EU in 2004 and 2007 finalized the 
process of integration. It further reduced trade barriers within the EU, mostly between 
EU12 countries themselves rather than between EU12 and the old EU members, and 
                                                 
7 Pelzman (1977) has found that the integration of the socialist countries into CMEA has generated a 
substantial additional intra-bloc trade at the expense of the trade with the rest of the world. He estimated the 
value of trade creation effect at 13.2 billion of $US in 1970. 
  6made the EU12 countries even more attractive destinations of FDI due to a favorable 
investment climate and convenient location for serving nearby markets
8. Figure 1 reports 
exports from EU12 and CIS countries in five broad product categories as well as total 
exports. It reveals a spectacular expansion of exports of manufactured goods
9 from the 
EU12 countries that exceeded 300 billion US dollars by 2007. 
  The 12 former Soviet Union republics (excluding Baltic States), on the other 
hand, have chosen to create an economic and political union, known as the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. Its formation was finalized in 1994 when the CIS 
Charter was ratified by 10 CIS members, except Turkmenistan and Ukraine which have 
chosen to participate in CIS selectively as associated members. However, the eastward 
expansion of EU and rapid economic growth of East Asia considerable weakened the 
economic attractiveness of CIS. In August 2009, Georgia officially denounced its 
membership, while Ukraine and several Central Asia countries were actively seeking 
closer economic relationships with EU and China consequently. 
  Similarly to the EU12, the CIS exports also expanded quite dramatically from 
2000 to 2007; the driving force of the CIS growth, however, was the expansion of the 
export of raw materials that grew well over 200 billion dollars by 2007. At the same time, 
exports of manufactured goods from the CIS stagnated. One of the explanations of the 
stark differences between EU12 and CIS in terms of industrial composition of exports is 
that an intra-industry and intra-firm trade increased significantly in EU12 between 2000 
and 2007. By attracting MNCs for locating their plants, EU12 has substantially increased 
intra-industry trade in high value added products and became an export platform for 
serving the CIS markets, while CIS countries failed to integrate into the global chains of 
production: the share of intermediate exports in the total export reached 20% in EU8
10 
and only 6% in CIS
11: “…there has been substantial change over the course of the transition in the 
commodity composition and factor intensity of trade by the EU-8 and the SEE economies, relatively little 
                                                 
8 For example, Slovakia is known as Detroit of the East. “Analysts say carmakers are drawn to Slovakia 
because it has a cheap but skilled work force, low taxes, weak labor unions, good highways and other 
logistics, and a strategic location in the geographic heart of Europe that's close to emerging markets in 
Russia, Ukraine and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union.” 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=6360844 
9 Products 7 and 8 of SITC classification at one digit level of aggregation 
10 EU8: Eastern European countries that joined EU in 2004 not including Cyprus and Malta 
11 Pradeep Mitra, “Innovation, Inclusion and Integration,” World Bank 2008 
  7has changed in these regards among the CIS countries, which effectively have been frozen in time. The 
result is that these countries are not active participants in the evolving international division of labor. The 
existing composition and factor intensity of exports puts the future growth prospects of the CIS at risk.” 
(World Bank, 2005) 
3  Model and estimation methodology 
Suppose that, contrary to the fact, the Ukraine joined EU in 2004. The accession 
conditions would require the Ukraine to satisfy a list of certain criteria that include stable 
democratic institutions, respect for the rule of law, a functioning market economy, and an 
adjustment of the administrative structure. The deep political, economic and 
administrative reforms coupled with better access to the large EU market and proximity 
of the CIS markets would lead to a significant improvement of investment climate and a 
consequent behavioral change in the Ukrainian economy, its industrial structure, and 
composition of export. 
  To capture the behavioral differences between the CIS countries and EU12 
countries, we separately estimate the gravity model at SITC two digit level of aggregation 
for the EU sample (exports from EU12, EUC4, and the Ukraine to 179 destination 
countries in 2000-2007)
12, and for the CIS sample (exports from the CIS countries to 179 
destination countries in 2000-2007). The time dimension is centered around the 2004 EU 
enlargement episode. We further predict the Ukrainian exports based on the results for 
the two different samples and compare them in order to assess the differences in the 
export patterns. 
  The main underlying assumption is that if the Ukraine were a part of EU by 2004, 
its trade patterns were more in line with that of the EU12 members, hence, projecting the 
trade patterns of the Eastern and Central European countries on the characteristics and 
geographical location of the Ukraine would provide us with rough estimates of the 
potential export patterns under the EU integration scenario. Likewise, projecting the trade 
patterns of the CIS on Ukraine, would give us rough estimates of the trade patterns of 
Ukraine under the CIS integration scenario. 
                                                 
12 We follow the “in-sample” approach of projecting trade flows because we capture country fixed effects. 
It would not be possible if Ukraine is excluded from the sample. 
  83.1  Estimation of the gravity model: econometric issues 
Due to prevalence of zero trade flows (an average share of non-zero trade flows across 
industries at SITC two digit level is 22 percent) and importance of distribution of firms 
within an industry for evaluation of changes in trade policy (e.g. Melitz, 2003; Bernard et 
al., 2003), we closely follow a modified version of the HMR model that takes into 
account zero trade flows and heterogeneity of firms. Ignoring zeroes in the bilateral 
trading matrix leads to the bias in the estimation of the gravity equation due to correlation 
between fixed costs of exporting and volumes of trade. Ignoring the heterogeneity of 
firms while evaluating potential gains from integration of the Ukraine into EU would 
miss the gains stemming from increasing productivity and restructuring of the product 
composition of exports. 
  The methodology is different from that of HMR in two important ways. First, we 
build a disaggregated model that allows for industry-level heterogeneity in trade costs.
13 
Looking at the disaggregated data allows us to analyze differences in export patterns of 
EU12 and CIS countries along the product dimension. We also are able to evaluate costs 
of non-integration for specific product categories that are important items in the 
Ukrainian export. 
  Second, we use a panel of exports in 2000-2007 while HMR evaluate their model 
on the cross-sectional data. The use of panel data allows looking at the dynamic impact of 
the EU enlargement. We treat an EU accession decision as an endogenous variable 
because it is linked to the graphical location of a country that correlates with the bilateral 
trade costs. Krugman 1991 stresses that FTAs are motivated by economic factors as well 
as political economy considerations. In an empirical investigation on economic 
determinants of FTA Baier and Bergstrand (2004) demonstrates that joining an FTA is 
more likely to be positive for countries that are closer, for pair of countries that are 
remote, for countries that are bigger and similar in the level of economic development. 
                                                 
13 Hummels (1999) studied trade costs for 3,000 goods for New Zealand and Latin American imports and 
over 15,000 goods for US imports and found that trade costs vary significantly across industries. In 
particular, freight costs for manufacturing are lower than for commodities and agricultural products. For 
example, importing fruits and vegetables costs approximately 15 percent of the value of shipment, while 
importing road vehicles costs 2.1 percent. 
  9  To deal with the endogeneity problem, we estimate the model by the Hausman-
Taylor method. It gained popularity in the trade literature due to its ability to remove 
biases in the estimation of the gravity equation and possibility to keep country specific 
time-invariant variables in the estimated equation. Serlenga and Shin (2007) tested 
performance of the Hausman-Taylor method in estimating the gravity equation of 
bilateral trade flows among 15 European countries in 1960-2001 and found that it 
provides more sensible results than fixed or random effect methods. McPherson and 
Trumbull (2008) used the Hausman-Taylor method to estimate the unrealized US-Cuban 
trade potential and also found that it is superior to the other popular methods of 
estimating panel data. Also, the time dimension helps us to remove biases stemming from 
unobserved industry and country-pair heterogeneity, and estimate the parameters of the 
model with greater precision. 
3.2  Model of Bilateral Export 
We modify the HMR set up by adding sectors indexed K k ,..., 1 = . Each country i=1…C 
has   firms that produce differentiated products in sector k. Let   denote total 
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where  1 > σ  is the elasticity of substitution across different products.  k θ  is the 
expenditure share of industry k in total consumption.   is the set of industry k goods 
that are available for consumption in country j. 
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  10where 
j Y is the gross domestic product of country j that is equal to the total expenditures 
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is the price index of industry k. 
3.2.2 Producers 
A country i firm produces one unit of output with   units of labor. a w
i 14   is country 
specific, reflecting the differences in institutions, technology, and factor prices. 
Following Melitz (2003), we specify a as a firm-specific parameter with the cumulative 
distribution function   over support  . Each firm is a monopolist over 
the production of a distinct good, but is small relative to the size of the market. A 
standard formula for monopolistic pricing implies that the firm charging the mill price as 
a constant mark-up over the marginal cost: 
i w







   
(4) 
  There are variable and fixed costs of delivering products to consumer markets that 
vary across industries.   is a melting iceberg transportation cost with  .   
is a fixed cost of exporting that is country-pair and industry specific with  . 
If the firm chooses to export its product to country j, consumers in country j pay 
ij















































   
(5) 
  The firm exports only if it receives positive operating profits, which is more likely 
if the productivity of the firm (
a
1
) is high, the input price ( ) is low, and the fixed costs 
i w
                                                 
14 We consider a partial equilibrium model with fixed capital during the period being investigated. Labor is 
the only input that is perfectly mobile across industries, but immobile across countries. 
  11of exporting ( ) are low. The least productive firm that exports to country j has the 







































Out of   firms that operate in country i in industry k, only   firms export to 
country j. The aggregate export in industry k from exporter i to country j is: 
i












































V Y N a a c a p E a G N X if   and 

















  The equation can be further simplified by using the equilibrium constraint on the 
















































3.3  Parameterization and Estimation 
In the following discussion we consider industry-specific equations but drop an index k to 
simplify notation. 
3.3.1 Selection  of  firms 
































A positive export is observed if   that is determined by the ratio of firm level 




  12plays the crucial role in defining trading partners with positive trade flows. We assume 
that the fixed costs are country-pair specific but not firm-specific even though they can 
vary from one product to another.  Suppose that fixed costs have the following functional 
form , where   represents fixed costs specific to the 
exporting country,   represents fixed costs specific to the importing country,   
represents country-pair-specific fixed costs, and   represents country-pair-specific 
random components. 
) exp( 3 2 1
ij
t
ij j i ij






  Trade costs associated with the shipping of a unit of good from country i to 
country j are modeled by assuming the commonly used functional form: 
) exp( ) ( ) (
1 ij
t
ij ij u Z dist Tt − =
− γ
ρ σ , 
where   is the distance between countries i and j, Z is a set of additional variables 
that determine trade costs, 
ij dist
γ  is the vector of coefficients associated with Z, and   is the 
error term that include all unobservable trade costs that are allowed to change over time. 
In particular, we assume that one of the determinants of trade costs is the current status of 
exporting county with respect to EU membership,  . It captures the effect of the 
integration process in terms of country’s exports. Also, we introduce a bilateral indicator 
variable   that takes value of 1 if both trading countries are full EU members and 
zero otherwise. It captures the effect of the EU accession on trade within EU relative to 







   includes all time varying and pair specific trade costs that are not directly 
controlled for in the gravity equation. Trade costs change over time as a result of 
integration processes in Europe and Central Asia region. Countries that are willing to join 
EU are required to satisfy certain economic, geographical, and political criteria and carry 
out wide range of economic reforms. Political reasons play an important role in 
determining trading pairs and products especially in CIS
ij
t u
15. All those considerations do 
                                                 
15 Russian Federation uses trade policies as a tool of political influence particularly frequently. For 
example, it banned exports of wine form Georgia and Moldova in 2006, exports of fish from Lativa in 
2006. The heated disputed over natural gas prices with Ukraine in 2006 and 2008 was also seen by many as 
a political tool to influence the political situation in Ukraine. 
  13not allow us to treat EU related variables as endogenous and require corrections to the 
estimation procedure that are discussed later. 
  Taking logs of both sides of equation (8) yields: 
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  Under normality, both sides of equation (10) are divided by  μ σ to normalize the 
selection equation: 
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where  is the unit-normal cdf.  ) (⋅ Φ
3.3.2 Gravity  equation 
Taking the logs of both sides of equation (7) and substituting for   yields: 
ij
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 is the multilateral resistance term, an integral 
measure of trade barriers of a country vis-à-vis all its trading partners (Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2003), which accounts for the endogenous and simultaneous determination of 
trade flows across all countries. The multilateral resistance term,   , and price 






  Following HMR, we use the information acquired at the first stage of the 
estimation by identifying , where   is the 
traditional inverse Mills ratio that accounts for the sample selection bias and the 
polynomial of degree three in 
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− Φ + =  corrects for the firm level 
heterogeneity. As shown by HMR, the polynomial of degree 3 is a sufficiently flexible 
  14and accurate approximation of the underlying unknown distribution of productivities, 
. Finally, the gravity equation takes the following form:  ) (a G
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  A traditional approach to deal with the multilateral resistance term and 
unobserved price level is by introducing country fixed effects (see Baldwin and Taglioni, 
2006, for a discussion on the usage of fixed effects in the gravity equation). Therefore, 
we assume that the error term can be represented as  . In this 
specification, we have exporter and importer fixed effects, common time effect, and pair 
specific component,
ij
t ij t j i
ij
t d d d ε ω ω + + + + =
ij ω , that is random and independently distributed across country-
pairs. We also allow for the correlation between  ij ω  and the components of vector Z that 
are related to the integration decisions. To solve the endogeneity problem, we apply the 
Hausman-Taylor method which uses time-varying variables that are not correlated with 
ij ω as instruments for endogenous components of Z. 
4  Data sources and variable definitions  
4.1 Dependent  Variable 
Table 1 presents the definitions of variables and sources of data. In the empirical analysis, 
we estimate unidirectional bilateral exports from twelve new EU members (EU12), four 
EU candidate countries (EUC4), and nine CIS countries to 179 destination countries in 
2000-2007 at two digit level of SITC classification. The export data measured in current 
US dollars are acquired from the COMTRADE database. Table A2 in the appendix 
presents the summary statistics of exports by exporting countries. 
4.2 Independent  Variables 
We differentiate all countries in the sample as non-members, EU candidates, and full EU 
members. A change in the status from a non-member to a candidate is determined 
  15according to the announcements made by the European Commission, which are taken 
from its website. Based on the acquired information, we construct an EUit variable that 
indicates the current status of a country with regard to the EU membership.  It takes the 
value of 1 if a country is officially announced as a candidate for accession, 2 if a country 
is a member of EU, and 0 otherwise. By including this variable, we capture the impact of 
the change in the EU status on the overall export within a SITC two digit category. 
During the investigated period two countries were officially announced candidate 
countries: Croatia in June 2004 and Macedonia in December 2006. All EU12 countries 
and Turkey have been announced candidates for accession before 2000 while Albania has 
not received an EU candidate status by 2007. In addition to the EUit variable, a binary 
variable bothEUijt is introduced to indicate whether both trading countries are the EU 
members or not. It captures the impact of the EU accession on exports within the EU. By 
including the two variables we can measure the direct impact of the EU integration on 
exports within and outside of EU. 
  GDP in current US dollars and population data were acquired from the 2008 
World Development Indicators (WDI). In addition, we include a set of variables that are 
routinely used in the gravity models to control for trade costs, geographical location, 
historical ties, and cultural similarities.  Geographical characteristics and distance 
between countries were collected from the Centre D’Etudes Prospectives et 
D’Informations Internationales (CEPII) in Paris. Colony and contiguity dummies 
(whether one of the countries in the country-pair was ever a colony of the other country 
and whether countries are located on the same continent) were used to control for pair-
specific trade costs that are not directly related to distance. Finally, same religion is a 
binary variable that takes value of 1 if majority of population in both trading countries 
share the same religion and 0 otherwise to capture the effect of cultural similarities 
between two nations on trade. 
4.3 Selection  Variables 
For identification of the first stage parameters, we chose two variables that enter the 
selection equation, but not the gravity equation. The common language dummy controls 
for the pair-specific fixed costs related to adapting to cultural and linguistic barriers 
  16between two countries (translation costs, advertising etc.). To control for country-specific 
fixed costs related to regulatory quality in exporting and importing countries, we used 
governance indicators of regulatory quality acquired from the World Bank “Governance 
matters, 2007” database constructed by Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi (2007). The 
index of the regulatory quality captures the effectiveness of bureaucracy, amount of red 
tape, and quality of policies and regulations that encourage free trade
16. 
  Exclusion of the variables from the gravity equation can be justified by the fact 
that the first variable is found as not robust determinant of exports at intensive margin as 
demonstrated by HMR and Martin and Pham (2008). In addition, we control for cultural 
differences in the gravity equation by including a common religion dummy. The 
regulatory quality variable measures effectiveness of government regulations which 
affects all exporters and is not linked to the volume of export. 
 
Table 1 Definition of variables and data sources
Variables Description Sources
Dependent variables
Export Export from i to j in sector k, in thousands of current $US. COMTRADE exports data aggregated to two digit




EU EU is an indicator variable that takes value of 1 if country i was officially announced as a candidate for the EU
accession and takes value of 2 if country i is the EU member, otherwise it takes value of 0.
bothEU Binary variable that takes value of 1 if trading countries i and j are both members of EU and 0 otherwise
Independent variables
  s Sector share in total value added. GTAP sectors are mapped to SITC2 sectors  GTAP Input-output tables
GDP Gross domestic product, in current $US.  World development indicators
Population Population World development indicators
Dist distance between the biggest cities of countries i and j. dkl is the distance between cities k and l. (Head and Mayer,
2002)
CEPII  
Contig Binary variable indicating whether the two countries are contiguous, 1 or not, 0.  CEPII
Colony Binary variable set equal to 1 if one of the countries used to be a colony of the other country. CEPII
Same continent Binary variable, set equal to 1 if countries i and j located on the same continent. Mapping of countries to continents
was taken from CEPII geodata.
Author's calculations
Same religion Binary variable set equal to 1 if countries i and j share the same religion. Countries are qualified into one ot the six
major religions - buddhist, catholic, hindu, muslim, orthodox, protestant - according to the following rule: if at least
50 percent of population in country i are following one of the major religions then the country i has major religion,
otherwise the country i is qualified as having no distinct religion affiliation. Data on religious composition of
population is taken from CIA - The World Factbook.
Author's calculations
Selection variables
Common language Binary variable indicating whether countries i and j share a common language. CEPII
Reg. quality Regulatory quality index measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and






kl j l i k ij d pop pop pop pop d ) / ( ) / (
 
 
                                                 
16 Since data on regulatory quality before 2002 are available on a biennial basis, we imputed the missing 
values for 2001 by using average values between 2000 and 2002. 
  175  Results 
This section has the following goals. First, we calibrate the estimation methodology by 
comparing how the Hausman-Taylor method performs relative to the OLS and fixed 
effect methods at the aggregate level. Second, we present and discuss the results 
estimated by the two stage HT procedure at the level of SITC two digit products. Finally, 
we calculate export gains form the EU accession of the Ukraine and discuss the main 
findings. 
5.1 Aggregate  results 
Table 2 reports the estimation results performed by the OLS (columns 1 and 2), two-stage 
Hausman-Taylor (HT)
17 (columns 3 and 4), and two-stage fixed effect (FE) methods 
(columns 5 and 6) for the EU and CIS samples. All regressions include exporting- and 
importing-country fixed effects, time dummies and a constant term. The country-pair 
cluster-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Three points are worth 
mentioning. First, there are important and statistically significant behavioral differences 
between the two samples regardless of the estimation procedure. Exports from the CIS 
countries are less elastic with respect to the size of an importing economy and more 
elastic with respect to the GDP of an exporting country. CIS exports are less elastic in 
absolute value with respect to the bilateral distance which reflects a higher geographical 
concentration of trade EU12 within the EU trade area. Second, the change in the status of 
EU integration does not have a significant effect on the aggregate export. Third, 
coefficients of the polynomial approximating   and inverse mills ratio   are jointly 
significant when the two stage procedure is implemented as indicated by the test at the 
bottom of the table which stresses the importance of including the first stage variables 





                                                 
17 In the case of the CIS sample, results of the random effect method are reported because EU and bothEU 
variables are not included. 
















































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(GDPi) 0.52** 0.83** 0.46** 0.83** 0.36** 0.59**
(0.137) (0.299) (0.095) (0.195) (0.096) (0.205)
Ln(GDPj) 0.75** 0.23 0.69** 0.16 0.74** 0.14
(0.078) (0.185) (0.058) (0.133) (0.059) (0.134)
Ln(Dist) -2.40** -1.61** -2.10** -1.42**
(0.106) (0.203) (0.116) (0.289)
Contig. Yes=1 0.42** 0.63* 0.67** 0.89*
(0.162) (0.248) (0.189) (0.395)
Same continent Yes=1 -0.38 -0.66** -3.25** -0.79**
(0.440) (0.153) (0.483) (0.211)
Colony Yes=1 0.044 -1.27** 0.33 -0.39
(0.286) (0.362) (0.242) (0.621)
Same religion Yes=1 -0.078 -0.022 -0.073 0.18
(0.078) (0.179) (0.084) (0.219)
EU 0.025 -0.025 -0.0047
(0.053) (0.036) (0.037)
bothEU 0.062 -0.0056 -0.072
(0.073) (0.047) (0.048)
Inverse Mills ratio, η 1.02* 1.75* 1.69** 2.15
(0.419) (0.741) (0.619) (1.113)
ψ 1.83** 3.69* 0.57 0.33
(0.671) (1.757) (0.833) (2.543)
ψ
2
-0.39 -0.70 -0.14 0.20
(0.201) (0.588) (0.244) (0.846)
ψ
3
0.033 0.039 0.015 -0.048
(0.020) (0.062) (0.023) (0.089)
Test: b1=0, b2=0, b3=0, b0=0 62.16 51.73 7.15 3.6
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006
R-sq overall 0.80 0.73 0.74
Observations 13149 5872 13149 5872 13149 5872
* p<0.05,** p<0.01
Note: The dependent variable is log of export from country i to country j. The models 1, 3,, and 5 are estimated on
sample of EU12 countries, EUC4 countries, and Ukraine. The models 2, 4, and 6 are estimated for 9 CIS countries
sample. Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Origin and destination country fixed effects, time
dummies, and constant term are included but not reported. In model 3, variables EU and both EU are endogenous
variables instrumented according to the Hausman-Taylor method.  
  19Table 3 Actual and predicted export of Ukraine in 2000-2007
Actual
EU1 EU2 CIS EU1 EU2 CIS EU1 EU2 CIS
Region
CIS 68.30 73.50 75.00 754.00 74.20 73.70 77.40 76.00 75.90 67.90
China 4.94 3.93 4.01 12.40 5.51 5.47 5.34 5.71 5.71 5.37
EU12 25.70 22.40 23.90 42.40 27.40 27.10 26.10 28.30 27.80 26.60
EU15 39.20 137.00 146.00 164.00 42.50 42.20 40.90 39.90 39.30 39.90
Rest of Europe 10.80 14.70 15.00 41.80 11.20 11.10 11.00 11.40 11.40 10.50
Rest of the world 54.80 54.30 55.30 69.70 50.50 50.20 49.90 52.90 52.90 52.10
Turkey 13.90 13.00 13.20 22.10 14.00 13.90 13.10 14.90 14.90 14.10
Total 218.00 319.00 332.00 1110.00 225.00 224.00 224.00 229.00 228.00 217.00
Actual
EU1 EU2 CIS EU1 EU2 CIS EU1 EU2 CIS
Region
CIS 19.10 15.80 15.80 217.00 16.50 16.70 23.20 15.90 16.00 18.50
China 2.74 1.05 1.05 3.81 1.38 1.40 1.67 1.38 1.38 1.50
EU12 9.16 5.91 5.91 12.90 6.99 7.08 8.08 7.02 7.29 7.67
EU15 13.20 40.80 40.80 51.80 12.90 13.10 13.10 11.50 11.90 11.50
Rest of Europe 3.72 3.68 3.68 12.70 2.90 2.93 3.47 2.79 2.80 3.16
Rest of the world 16.90 16.90 16.90 22.20 14.40 14.60 15.30 14.80 14.90 15.10
Turkey 4.01 3.20 3.20 6.60 3.64 3.68 4.04 3.58 3.59 3.90
Total 68.80 87.30 87.30 327.00 58.80 59.50 68.90 57.00 57.80 61.30
Actual
EU1 EU2 CIS EU1 EU2 CIS EU1 EU2 CIS
Region
CIS 49.20 57.80 59.20 537.00 57.70 57.00 54.20 60.00 59.90 49.50
China 2.20 2.88 2.96 8.62 4.13 4.08 3.67 4.34 4.33 3.87
EU12 16.50 16.50 18.00 29.50 20.40 20.00 18.10 21.30 20.50 19.00
EU15 26.00 96.50 105.00 112.00 29.50 29.10 27.90 28.40 27.40 28.50
Rest of Europe 7.05 11.00 11.30 29.10 8.26 8.15 7.56 8.62 8.60 7.36
Rest of the world 37.90 37.40 38.40 47.50 36.10 35.60 34.60 38.10 38.00 37.00
Turkey 9.93 9.79 10.00 15.50 10.40 10.20 9.07 11.30 11.30 10.20
Total 149.00 232.00 245.00 780.00 166.00 164.00 155.00 172.00 170.00 155.00
Note: Panel A reports total export of Ukraine to its major trading partners in 2000-2007, which is presented in the first column. It is compared with 
predicted exports computed by the OLS method, by the two stage Hausman-Taylor method, and by the pair fixed effect method. Panels B and C 
report the same statistics in 2000-2003 and 2004-2007 respectively. Three different counterfactual scenarios are considered:EU1 - Ukraine has been 
announced EU candidate in 2000, EU2 - in addition to EU1, Ukraine has become an EU member in 2004, CIS - Ukraine integrates into CIS. 
OLS method 2 stage HT method FE
A Cumulative export, billions of $US in 2000-2007
B Cumulative export, billions of $US in 2000-2003
OLS method 2 stage HT method FE
C Cumulative export, billions of $US in 2004-2007
OLS method 2 stage HT method FE
 
 
  How well the three estimation methods discussed above can predict the 
geographical pattern of the aggregate export? Panel A of Table 3 shows actual and 
projected exports from Ukraine to its trading partners in 2000-2007. The first column 
reports the actual exports. In addition, it reports predictions generated by the OLS, two-
stage HT, and two-stage FE methods under three different scenarios: EU1 – Ukraine has 
been announced an EU accession candidate in 2000, EU2 – in addition to EU1, Ukraine 
  20has joined EU in 2004, CIS – Ukraine integrated into CIS trading bloc
18. The OLS 
method performs poorly in explaining geographical distribution of export. It predicts that 
deeper CIS integration of Ukraine would increase aggregate export more than four times 
relative to the actual export. Export to CIS would have increased more than tenfold! It is 
hard to imagine what would cause such an explosion of trade. Such an implausible result 
casts substantial doubts on the applicability of the OLS method to predict export flows. 
The two-stage HT and FE methods, on the other hand, generate projections that are in 
remarkable agreement with each other and with the actual data. 
  According to the two-stage HT results, there are very small differences in exports 
generated by the CIS and EU integration scenarios which bring a conclusion that at the 
aggregate level, there are very small benefits of the EU integration. It seems that this 
result confirms the World Bank (2005) findings that the CIS countries are as well 
integrated into the global trading system as a typical Eastern European country and 
therefore further integration with EU would not bring any substantial gains to the exports 
of the CIS countries. However, more careful investigation of the results presented in 
panels B and C reveals very interesting dynamics. 
  Panel B of Table 3 reports the pre-accession patterns of exports. The HT method 
predicts that if Ukraine had chosen deeper integration into the CIS bloc, its pre-accession 
export levels would have been very similar to the actual ones, while the deeper EU 
integration would lead to somewhat lower levels of exports. Under any integration 
scenario, post-accession exports, reported in the panel C, would have been higher relative 
to the actual exports. For example, the total export in 2004-2007 under EU2 would have 
been 10% higher than the actual exports. Importantly, the export gains under the EU1 and 
EU2 scenarios would have been higher relative to the CIS scenario. Predictions generated 
by the pair fixed effect method show slightly lower export levels before integration and 
slightly higher export levels after integration relative to the HT method. 
  Figure 2 reports time series of Ukrainian actual exports as well as predicted 
exports for EU2 and CIS scenarios to four groups of countries: CIS, EU12, EU15, and the 
rest of the World. The benefits of the EU integration for the Ukraine would have started 
playing an important role after 2004 and would accumulate over time. This pattern 
                                                 
18 The CIS scenario models Ukraine as a typical CIS country. 
  21reflects that integration into EU markets is a long and complex process that does not 

















































Actual exports compared with two counterfactual scenarios: 1 EU - Ukraine became EU member in 2004, 2 CIS - Ukraine integrated in CIS
Destination countries are aggregated into four regions: CIS - countries of commonwealth of independent states, EU15 - countries that became
EU members before 2004, EU12 - countries that became EU members after 2004, RoW - all other countries
Figure 2 Actual and predicted exports by regions
 
The results may be sensitive to the choice of the countries in the sample. As a robustness 
check, we estimated the model using an enlarged EU sample that included “old” EU 
members. The results remain the same qualitatively, while there were some minor 
quantitative changes. 
  To summarize, the analysis of aggregate trade flows reveals that any integration 
strategy would be preferable to the current situation of being lost in transition: currently, 
Ukraine is moving away from CIS but not getting closer to EU. The benefits of the EU 
integration are higher relative to the CIS integration: by 2007, the deeper EU integration 
would generate higher export volumes to any trading partner. The change in the accession 
status would not play an important role for determination of the export levels, while the 
behavioral change would be the major driving force of export expansion. From the 
methodological standpoint, taking into account the selection of the trading partners and 
industry-level heterogeneity are important in generating plausible export predictions: both 
the two-stage HT and two-stage FE methods are preferable to the one-stage OLS method 
of estimating the export levels. 
  225.2  Impact of the change in the EU status on export at 2 digit 
SITC level 
As the next step, we estimate the gravity model at the level of SITC two digit products 
for the EU and CIS samples using the two-stage HT method. The HT method is preferred 
over the FE method because it allows controlling for the endogeneity of the 
SITC 2 eu bothEU chi2 Observations eu bothEU chi2 Observations
2 -0.37** 1.03** 2933.5 22559 -1.01** 2.23** 1827.8 5590
4 -0.09 0.17 4334.2 23766 -0.29* 0.61** 2450.7 6873
22 0.04 0.14 1856.5 15759 0.11 0.26 1095 2925
24 0.12* 0.29** 3216.3 20230 -0.11 -0.21 2326.7 6087
27 0.11* -0.17 3235.6 22678 -0.13 -0.09 2110.9 5605
28 0.00 -0.03 2292.8 15895 0.01 0.34* 1452.1 3900
32 0.26** -0.18 1415.5 16303 0.41 -0.46* 1080.5 2844
33 0.08 0.01 3999.2 23511 -0.51** 0.39** 2466 7223
42 -0.12 0.34** 2487.6 19975 -0.84** 0.87* 1139 3193
51 -0.12* 0.13 3682.4 22542 0.26** -0.01 2860.1 7493
52 -0.12* 0.05 2771.3 22287 -0.31 0.28* 2128.4 6691
56 0.12* 0.00 1778.4 19295 -0.25 0.03 1123.2 3221
64 -0.21** -0.02 3810.6 23783 -0.74** 0.45** 3207.9 9462
66 0.00 -0.22* 3666 24038 0.03 0.2 4714.4 10154
67 -0.06 0.05 3258.5 23511 -0.24** 0.49** 4476.3 9381
68 0.11* 0.30** 3664.3 22151 0.11 -0.21 2728.7 6663
69 0.09 -0.02 3963.1 23766 0.12* -0.03 7061.5 11778
71 0.04 -0.17 4323.6 23630 -0.18* 0.30* 3700.1 9832
72 0.02 -0.08 4306.8 23766 -0.05 -0.16* 5939.6 9965
74 0.00 -0.22 4135.8 23511 0.00 -0.01 8355.1 12034
77 0.04 0.02 4885.1 24038 0.07 0.02 7972.2 12707
78 0.09 -0.06 3963.3 23766 0.24** 0.13 5880 9447
79 -0.07 -0.06 3496.5 22831 0.15 -0.09 1453.8 6576
84 0.04 0.16 4311.3 23239 -0.22** -0.03 5952.3 9351
* p>0.05, ** p>0.01
First stage, Probit Second stage, HT method
Table 4 Two stage Hausman-Taylor results at SITC 2 digit level
Notes: Table reports estimates of the coefficients EU and bothEU of the probit and Hausman-Taylor regressions for the sample 
of EU12, EUC4, and Ukraine in 2000-2007 for selected products at SITC 2 digit level. Same variables as for the aggregate two 
stage HT regression are included but not reported  Time-, exporter, and importer fixed effects are included but not reported. For 
probit, marginal effects are reported. For HT method, EU and bothEU variables are treated as endogenous. 
EU 
accession process, while providing results similar to the pair fixed effect method in terms 
of predicting trade patterns. The industrial structure is captured by an exporting country 
fixed effect under assumption that composition of industries does not change significantly 
  23over the investigated period
19. Table 4 reports the point estimates of the coefficients of 
 and   variables at the first and second stages of the estimation procedure 






20. Unlike on aggregate level, the change in the accession status plays a 
significant role on exports of some products. In general, the effect varies from sector to 
sector and can be positive or negative. For example, a change in the EU accession status 
from a candidate to a member reduces probability and volume of the overall trade in diary 
products and birds’ eggs (SITC code 2), while it increases probability and volume of 
exports of those products within the EU. As another example, a change in the EU 
accession status increases the overall export volume of road vehicles (code 78), but has 
no significant effect on probability and volume of trade within the EU. 
5.3 Forgone export gains due to non-integration at SITC two-
digit level 
This section calculates and reports forgone gains in the Ukrainian export under the EU1 
and EU2 scenarios against the benchmark CIS scenario. First, we generate a dataset with 
predicted exports of sector k to region j at time t,  , under the three scenarios: 
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  Figure 3 summarizes how the export gains would evolve over time across four 
large product groups: agriculture and food, chemicals and processed materials, 
manufactured goods, and raw materials
21. According to the results, by 2007, Ukraine 
would have almost doubled export of manufactured goods under the EU2 scenario. This 
result comes despite the fact that in 2000 the exports of manufactured goods under the 
                                                 
19 Alternatively, we constructed shares of the value added of each SITC two digit product in the total value 
added based on Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) input-output tables. It does not have a significant 
impact on our main findings but have two serious drawbacks. For most countries in the sample, the input-
output tables are available for only one year. In addition, Moldova and Macedonia are not in the GTAP7 
database. Given the drawbacks, this approach reduces the sample size and precludes us from using of 
exporting counties fixed effects.  
20 Products were rank according to the total value of export in 2000-2007. 
21 Agriculture and food (SITC 1 digit codes 0,1, and 2), Chemicals and processed materials (codes 5 and 6), 
Manufactured goods (codes 7 and 8), Raw materials (codes 3 and 4). 
  24EU2 scenario is 50% lower than under the CIS scenario! Other groups of products does 
not have such a clear trend but tend to have negative gains at the early stages of the 
integration process and positive gains at the later stages. Also, the EU2 scenario generates 
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Benchmark CIS scenario is compared with two scenarios of integaration into EU
Figure 3 Export gains from Ukrainian EU accession  across 2 digit SITC2 products
 
  Table 5 presents more disaggregated results for the 24 most important products to 
the five groups of countries: CIS, EU12, EU15, RoE (Rest of Europe), RoW (Rest of the 
world). The highest expected benefits of the Ukraine integrating into the EU would have 
come from a substantial increase in exports of various types of machinery and equipment 
(codes 71, 72, and 74), road vehicles and transport equipment (codes 78 and 79), and 
apparel and closing accessories (code 84). These gains would have been virtually 
uniformly positive across all groups of countries and economically large. As an example, 
the Ukraine would have increased export of road vehicles (code 78) to the CIS countries 
by 70 percent under the EU1 scenario and by 88 percent under the EU2 scenario, while 
export to the EU15 would have been increased by 60 and 82 percent respectively. The 
export of raw materials, on the other hand, would have either declined as, for example, 
export of petroleum and its products (code 33) or remained relatively stable as export of 
  25iron and steel (code 67). However, the export of manufactures of steel (code 69), one of 
the most important articles of the Ukrainian export, would have increased uniformly. 
  Another important group of products where Ukraine could have potentially gained 
is food and agriculture. The gains would have been positive for exports to the EU 
countries but mostly negative for exports to other group of countries. Also, gains would 
have been significantly higher under a more optimistic EU2 scenario. For example, 
realization of the EU2 scenario would have increased exports of diary products (code 2) 
and cereals (code4) to EU15 countries by 95 percent and 14 percent under the EU2 
scenario and by 38 percent and 4 percent under the EU1 scenario. At the same time, 
Ukraine would have substantially reduced exports of food and agricultural products to 
CIS countries under both scenarios of the European integration. For example, in diary 
products the export to CIS would have reduced by 20 percent under the EU1 scenario and 
by 31 percent under the EU2 scenario. Given the mixed evidence, there are no apparent 
benefits of joining EU for the agriculture and food industry. 
  Change in the composition of exports towards manufactured products is a positive 
development for, at least, two reasons. First, experimenting with production of new 
varieties, a developing country learns its comparative advantage in a competitive 
environment with high uncertainty about the demand for new products (Hausmann and 
Rodrik, 2003). As a result, higher share of high quality goods in export is associated with 
higher future economic growth (Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik, 2007). Second, moving 
away from exporting primary commodities towards exporting manufactured products is 
desirable because of a general trend towards a decline in terms of trade of primary 
commodities (Athukurola, 2000). 
  A disaggregated analysis also agrees with the analysis of the aggregate export on 
virtually no gains from the EU integration in terms of the cumulative aggregate export in 
2000-2007 because the substantial gains in exports of manufactured goods at the later 
stages of integration are counter-balanced by losses at the early stages. However, the 
strong upward trend in manufactured goods clearly indicates that over time the benefits of 
integration accumulate very rapidly. 
 
  26SITC2
E U 1 ,  %E U 2 ,  %E U 1 ,  %E U 2 ,  %E U 1 ,  %E U2, % EU1, % EU2, % EU1, % EU2, %
2 -20.3 -31.0 -6.6 33.0 38.2 94.7 -6.1 -11.1 -13.7 -14.8
4 -17.9 -22.0 -0.1 9.2 4.3 13.6 1.8 -3.8 -4.9 -10.5
22 -15.4 -13.0 1.1 10.7 10.0 19.1 11.2 14.2 -3.4 -1.9
24 -11.6 -13.4 -8.6 -12.5 -4.4 -7.1 -3.8 -5.8 2.2 1.2
27 -6.5 -9.3 -1.9 -6.2 19.3 14.8 2.6 -0.6 -1.7 -3.8
28 -1.0 -0.8 -0.2 9.0 0.4 8.3 30.5 30.7 -6.8 -6.7
32 0.9 14.3 -1.1 -2.5 7.4 5.9 -1.2 12.3 16.8 32.7
33 7.5 -8.2 -11.3 -15.2 -11.2 -14.9 -2.9 -18.8 2.1 -12.1
42 -12.0 -25.2 -17.2 -16.6 -32.0 -31.5 -29.8 -37.1 -34.0 -40.3
51 0.4 7.9 -12.0 -6.0 -14.0 -8.9 11.3 20.2 -3.4 3.2
52 -10.2 -15.1 -5.0 -5.8 -2.2 -3.0 9.5 1.9 -2.5 -7.2
56 -9.8 -13.7 -6.5 -10.4 9.7 6.0 15.5 9.6 -10.6 -13.7
64 -20.9 -30.5 -11.9 -16.0 4.0 -0.7 -3.4 -12.3 0.4 -3.4
66 -16.4 -15.8 -3.4 1.9 -6.3 -3.4 -13.4 -12.8 -1.2 -0.8
67 10.6 3.0 -9.6 -3.1 -2.2 3.1 0.1 -5.6 -6.8 -10.8
68 -12.1 -9.3 -5.0 -7.4 -2.9 -4.4 -7.6 -5.1 -8.3 -6.5
69 10.9 16.2 13.8 17.1 5.9 8.2 12.7 17.4 7.7 10.9
71 11.8 5.4 10.5 14.8 26.0 30.0 16.3 10.2 28.2 22.1
72 12.3 10.6 6.1 -0.4 15.4 9.7 4.6 3.1 15.3 13.8
74 16.7 16.6 21.1 20.7 26.3 26.0 19.9 19.8 16.0 16.0
77 18.9 22.3 46.5 51.2 23.5 26.4 29.8 33.0 26.3 29.2
78 70.2 88.4 37.4 59.4 60.4 81.8 52.6 67.8 21.0 29.8
79 -20.7 -17.3 -0.3 1.3 23.1 24.9 14.6 19.7 39.6 45.0
84 27.3 18.9 13.9 6.2 13.7 10.2 11.3 3.6 -1.1 -3.4
Average 0.5 -0.9 2.1 5.5 8.9 12.9 7.3 6.3 3.2 2.8
Table 5 Export gains from EU integration
Notes:Table reports a percentage change in exports of moving from the CIS scenario of integration to the EU1 and EU2 scenarios of 
integration. The scenarios are EU1 - Ukraine has been announced EU candidate, EU2 - Ukraine has become an EU member in 2004, CIS - 
Ukraine did not integrate with EU.  Only 24 most important exports (in terms of total value of actual exports in examined period)  are 
reported. SITC sectors are described in the Table 1A.
Region
CIS EU12 EU15 RoE RoW
First, total export in sector k in region i, 
i
sk TE , is computed for each of the three scenarios. Next, the percentage changes are 
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  276  Conclusions 
In order to access costs of non-integration of Ukraine in the EU in 2000-2007, we 
estimate a gravity model at the level of SITC two digit products applying a newly 
developed two stage procedure that accounts for selection of exporters and firm-level 
heterogeneity. We introduce and measure two different channels of the effect of 
integration on trade: a direct effect of integration and an indirect effect of the behavioral 
change in the parameters of the gravity equation. Two endogenous variables,  and 
, capture the former, while differences in the coefficients of the gravity equation 
estimated for the two different samples capture the latter. The direct effect is found to be 
important and highly product-specific for disaggregated exports, but non-significant for 
the aggregate export. The behavioral changes, on the other hand, play an important role in 





  We calibrate the estimation method using the aggregate data and show that the 
two-stage HT and two-stage pair-fixed effect methods generate similar predictions, while 
a simple OLS method produce highly implausible results. Any integration strategy would 
be preferable to the current situation of being lost in transition. Yet, the benefits of the 
EU integration are higher relative to the CIS integration. Therefore, the vector of   
integration into EU should be supported by Ukrainian policymakers as a better 
integration strategy. 
  Moving to the disaggregated data, we estimate the costs of non-integration into 
the EU bloc relative to the integration into the CIS bloc at the level of SITC two digit 
products and find that the most losses in terms of foregone exports are expected in 
manufactured goods with almost doubled exports in 2007 relative to the CIS scenario. As 
an example, Ukraine would have increased export of road vehicles (code 78) to the CIS 
countries by 70 percent under the EU1 scenario and by 88 percent under the EU2 
scenario, while export to the EU15 would have increased by 60 and 82 percent 
respectively. Under the EU2 scenario, Ukraine would have also increased export of diary 
products and cereals to EU15 countries by 95 and 15 percent respectively, but would 
  28have lost CIS markets which make the overall effect of EU integration on agriculture and 
food exports quite ambiguous. 
  There are several important directions for future work. The paper looks at the 
impact of the EU integration on exports, while integration can have important effects on 
imports, labor market, foreign direct investments, and economic growth. Also the paper 
did not discuss the supply side of membership. It simply assumes that Ukraine could join 
at some point if it is beneficial for the country. However, an important question is: would 
it be beneficial for EU to integrate Ukraine? To answer this question requires an analysis 
of costs and benefits of Ukrainian accessions for current EU members. 
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Table A1 SITC2 codes description
SITC2 DESCRIPTION SITC2 DESCRIPTION
0 LIVE ANIMALS OTHER THAN FISH 55 ESSENTIAL OILS AND RESINOIDS AND PERFUME
1 MEAT AND MEAT PREPARATIONS 56 FERTILIZERS
2 DAIRY PRODUCTS AND BIRDS' EGGS 57 PLASTICS IN PRIMARY FORMS
3 FISH, CRUSTACEANS, MOLLUSCS 58 PLASTICS IN NONPRIMARY FORMS
4 CEREALS AND CEREAL PREPARATIONS 59 CHEMICAL MATERIALS AND PRODUCTS, N.E.S.
5 VEGETABLES AND FRUIT 61 LEATHER, LEATHER MANUFACTURES, N.E.S.
6 SUGARS, SUGAR PREPARATIONS AND HONEY 62 RUBBER MANUFACTURES, N.E.S.
7 COFFEE, TEA, COCOA, SPICES 63 CORK AND WOOD MANUFACTURES
8 FEEDING STUFF FOR ANIMALS 64 PAPER, PAPERBOARD, AND ARTICLES
9 MISCELLANEOUS EDIBLE PRODUCTS 65
TEXTILE YARN, FABRICS, MADE-UP ARTICLES, 
N.E.S.
11 BEVERAGES 66
NONMETALLIC MINERAL MANUFACTURES, 
N.E.S.
12 TOBACCO AND TOBACCO MANUFACTURES 67 IRON AND STEEL
21 HIDES, SKINS AND FURSKINS, RAW 68 NONFERROUS METALS
22 OIL SEEDS AND OLEAGINOUS FRUITS 69 MANUFACTURES OF METALS, N.E.S.
23 CRUDE RUBBER 71
POWER GENERATING MACHINERY AND 
EQUIPMENT
24 CORK AND WOOD 72
MACHINERY SPECIALIZED FOR PARTICULAR 
INDUSTRIES
25 PULP AND WASTE PAPER 73 METALWORKING MACHINERY
26 TEXTILE FIBERS AND THEIR WASTES 74 GENERAL INDUSTRIAL MACHINERY, N.E.S.
27 CRUDE FERTILIZERS AND CRUDE MINERALS 75
OFFICE AND AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING 
MACHINES
28 METALLIFEROUS ORES AND METAL SCRAP 76
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND SOUND 
RECORDING
29
CRUDE ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE MATERIALS, 
N.E.S. 77
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND APPLIANCES, 
N.E.S.
32 COAL, COKE AND BRIQUETTES 78
ROAD VEHICLES (INCLUDING AIR-CUSHION 
VEHICLES)
33
PETROLEUM, PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND 
RELATED 79 TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT, N.E.S.
34 GAS, NATURAL AND MANUFACTURED 81
PREFABRICATED BUILDINGS; SANITARY, 
PLUMBING, HEATING
35 ELECTRIC CURRENT 82
FURNITURE AND PARTS THEREOF; BEDDING, 
MATTRESSES
41 ANIMAL OILS AND FATS 83
TRAVEL GOODS, HANDBAGS AND SIMILAR 
CONTAINERS
42 FIXED VEGETABLE FATS AND OILS 84
ARTICLES OF APPAREL AND CLOTHING 
ACCESSORIES
43 ANIMAL OR VEGETABLE FATS AND OILS 85 FOOTWEAR
51 ORGANIC CHEMICALS 87 PROFSSIONAL, SCIENTIFIC  INSTRUMENTS, N.E.S.
52 INORGANIC CHEMICALS 88
PHOTOGRAPHIC APPARATUS; WATCHES AND 
CLOCKS
53 DYEING, TANNING AND COLORING MATERIALS 89
MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURED ARTICLES, 
N.E.S.
54 MEDICINAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS  
 
  32Source country
Number of 
Positive Exports
As % of All 
Postitive 






As % Value 
of Total 
Export in the 
Sample
Albania 3 870 1.0 1155 4.5 0.2
Bulgaria 30 947 8.0 2364 73.2 2.7
Cyprus 15 910 4.1 501 8.0 0.3
Czechia 38 788 10.0 13034 506.0 18.3
Estonia 21 214 5.5 2302 48.8 1.8
Croatia 20 002 5.1 2945 58.9 2.1
Hungary 32 408 8.3 12519 406.0 14.7
Lithuania 23 293 6.0 3140 73.1 2.6
Latvia 18 152 4.7 1738 31.6 1.1
Macedonia 9 627 2.5 1484 14.3 0.5
Malta 10 983 2.8 1733 19.0 0.7
Poland 34 990 9.0 16134 565.0 20.5
Romania 27 254 7.0 6419 175.0 6.3
Slovakia 25 799 6.6 8481 219.0 7.9
Slovenia 27 420 7.1 4442 122.0 4.4
Turkey 47 853 12.3 9081 435.0 15.8
EU12 plus EUC4 388 510 100.0 7097 2760.0 100.0
Armenia 5 426 4.3 998 5.4 0.3
Azerbaijan 7 448 5.9 3891 29.0 1.7
Byelarus 16 250 12.9 6356 103.0 6.2
Georgia 6 795 5.4 759 5.2 0.3
Kazakhstan 11 465 9.1 14203 163.0 9.8
Kyrgyzstan 5 272 4.2 1002 5.3 0.3
Moldova 7 711 6.1 894 6.9 0.4
Russia 36 876 29.3 30789 1140.0 68.3
Ukraine 28 404 22.6 7773 221.0 13.2
CIS 125 647 100.0 13323 1670.0 100.0
Note: SITC 2 digit exports of EU12, EUC4, and CIS to 179 countries in 2000-2007. 
Source: COMTRADE
Table A2 EU12, EUC4, and CIS Exports in 2000-2007
A. EU12 and EUC4
B. CIS
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